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Abstract: Spectrum reform initiatives in the US and Europe have identified a need to 
move away from the traditional "command and control" approach towards flexible and 
tradable licences and licence-exemption. Current regulatory initiatives are tending to focus 
on the flexible licensing route, and there is a risk that licence-exemption will be sidelined 
during the important formative years of this major policy transition. This must not happen; 
licence-exemption supports innovation and entrepreneurship and is an important second 
leg of a market-based spectrum management regime. A current case in point is the 
transition in UHF frequency bands from analogue to digital TV, where licence exempt use 
of resulting gaps in the spectrum could yield enormous benefits for citizens and 
consumers. 
Key words: spectrum policy, spectrum management, wireless services, deregulation, 
digital dividend. 
 
here is a growing global consensus that the traditional method of 
allocating spectrum is outdated and inefficient. In the United States, 
the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force (FCC, 2002) concluded that 
current spectrum policies were in need of reform. It recognised three 
spectrum management models:  
- "command and control," the traditional method of spectrum 
management, in which allowable spectrum uses and users are 
determined by regulatory judgment;  
- "exclusive use," where a licensee has exclusive, flexible, and 
transferable rights to use specified spectrum; 
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- "commons," where unlimited numbers of unlicensed users share 
frequencies. 
The recommendation was that use of the latter two should be expanded 
throughout the radio spectrum, with use of the traditional method being kept 
to a minimum.  
In the United Kingdom, Ofcom's Spectrum Framework Review (Ofcom, 
2005) came to comparable conclusions, and in Europe both the Commission 
and Parliament (EC, 2005a; EP, 2007) have expressed similar aspirations. 
The same three spectrum management models and the same direction of 
reform have been identified in each case, although the detailed language 
differs, as summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 - The three spectrum management models and the direction of regulatory reform 
FCC (2002) Ofcom (2005) EC (2005a) 
Command and control, the 
traditional method of 
spectrum management in 
the US, in which allowable 
spectrum uses and users 
are determined by 
regulatory judgment. 
Command & control, the 
historical approach where the 
regulator decides how much 
spectrum each application 
should have and allocates and 
assigns the spectrum 
accordingly. 
Detailed ex-ante 
administrative decisions. 
This approach has come 
under increasing pressure, 
due to the high 
technological turnover and 
the strong demand for 
wireless applications.  
Exclusive use, where a 
licensee has exclusive, 
flexible, and transferable 
rights to use specified 
spectrum. 
 
Market mechanisms, broadly 
the use of auctions and 
trading with liberalisation, to 
allow the market to modify 
historical allocations towards 
those more likely to maximise 
economic efficiency.   
Spectrum markets can 
improve the efficiency of 
use of spectrum, since 
industry is better suited than 
regulators to identify the 
highest-value applications.  
Commons, where unlimited 
numbers of unlicensed 
users share frequencies. 
 
Licence-exempt use. The 
regulator allows free access to 
the spectrum, although 
normally with restrictions on 
power levels, making it most 
suitable for short-range 
devices.  
Licence-exempt use, where 
equipment (typically low-
power consumer goods) 
that fulfils certain technical 
conditions is used without a 
licence.  
"Existing spectrum that is 
subject to command-and-
control regulation should 
be transitioned to the more 
flexible exclusive use and 
commons models to the 
greatest extent possible" 
"As a light-touch regulator our 
preference is to move away 
from central management, 
allowing market forces to 
prevail and increasing the use 
of licence-exemption" 
"An EU-wide balanced 
approach should be sought 
between all spectrum 
models. The optimal "mix" 
between them will depend 
on various criteria, such as 
speed to market, protection 
from harmful interference, 
quality of service and 
fostering the internal market 
and innovation" 
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However, converting these policy aspirations into practical decisions is 
very challenging. For example, the packaging of lots has had a strong 
influence on the outcome of spectrum auctions and hence regulatory 
judgment is still very much present in a "market-based" approach. Also, 
existing operators have tended to resist service neutrality. This is usually on 
technical grounds, although commercial considerations may also play a part. 
This has made any practical benefits from spectrum trading and 
liberalisation patchy so far. 
In this paper, we are concerned with a different and possibly even more 
significant challenge: how to determine the right balance between "flexible 
licensed" 1 and licence-exempt use of spectrum in future. 
In its Spectrum Framework Review, Ofcom (2005) offered some 
illustrative numbers for the balance between spectrum management models 
that might be aimed for over the next few years. From a position in 2000 
where 96% of spectrum below 60GHz was allocated by Command & Control 
(CC) and 4% licence-exempt, a potential outcome for 2010 was set out 
which would reduce CC to 22% by dramatically increasing the use of market 
mechanisms (flexible licensing) from zero to 71% and marginally increasing 
licence-exempt allocation to 7% 2.  
The CC figures are based on an assessment of practicability, given a 
policy of moving away from this model where possible to a regime of flexible 
licensing with market allocation (by auction). The licence-exempt figures are 
approached in a different way, and are derived from a combination of two 
approaches - a theoretical calculation of what the demand for short-range 
communication might be assuming that each person might use up to 
100Mbit/s of capacity, and a pragmatic assessment of the occupancy trends 
of current licence-exempt bands. The illustrative numbers are based on an 
assumption that by 2010 an extra 200MHz or so of spectrum for licence-
exempt applications might be allocated adjacent to the current 5GHz bands. 
                     
1 In this paper we use the phrase "flexible licensing" to refer to the exclusive use / market 
mechanisms approach. 
2 Percentages were calculated on a weighted basis, so that 100MHz of bandwidth with a centre 
frequency of 1GHz would score the same as 1GHz of bandwidth with a centre frequency of 
10GHz etc. 
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  Licence-exemption risks being sidelined 
It is not surprising against this background that the current practical focus 
for spectrum reform in the UK and elsewhere in Europe is on flexible 
licensing employing market mechanisms rather than on licence-exemption.  
For example, the European Commission has made a detailed 
communication to the Council and Parliament on "a market based approach 
to spectrum management", while licence-exempt studies are relegated to 
"future work" (EC, 2005b).  
Another example is Ofcom's Digital Dividend Review, which presents the 
choice on future spectrum allocation as a binary one between a "market-led" 
approach and an "interventionist" approach (Ofcom, 2006). In this review, 
licence exemption is considered not as market-led but as a regulatory 
intervention, and hence subject to a very high burden of proof. However, 
licence auctions require significant regulatory intervention themselves, 
particularly in defining the bundles of goods to be traded. It is therefore not 
appropriate to caricature licence-exemption as interventionist, and auctions 
as purely market based. Indeed, licensing itself is a regulatory intervention 3. 
There is a significant risk that licence-exemption will be sidelined during 
these formative initial years of spectrum reform for reasons which include:  
• Flexible licensing is where the majority of the changes are expected. 
• Flexible licensing requires a lot of detailed ground work from the 
regulators on defining spectrum usage rights. 
• The potential economic benefits of flexible licensing can be modelled 
more readily than those of licence-exemption. 
• There are fewer advocates for licence-exemption than for flexible 
licensing (or even for the status quo), for reasons explained below. 
Marginalising licence-exemption will harm consumers and hobble 
innovation. We show below that there is significant demand for applications 
based on licence-exempt allocations, and that innovation flourishes in these 
                     
3 The European Authorisation Directive states that "rights of use should not be restricted except 
where this is unavoidable in view of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the need to ensure the 
efficient use thereof." It could be argued therefore that licensing is the exception that must be 
justified by need, not licence-exemption. 
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bands. A delay, let alone a foreclosure, of these benefits will reduce the total 
value that can be derived from spectrum use. 
Auctions are not the only way of allowing the market to determine the 
best use of the spectrum; a licence-exempt spectrum commons is also 
"market-led", since the market decides which applications succeed, not the 
regulator. 
Further, licence-exempt allocations are collective goods, and therefore 
likely to be underprovided assuming rational actors working in their own self-
interest. The regulator therefore needs to take a pro-active approach to 
achieve the greatest social welfare.  
Level of demand for licence-exempt spectrum 
A presumption underlying the current relatively low priority given to 
licence-exemption is that current licence-exempt bands are lightly used and 
that demand for new spectrum is not high (Ofcom, 2007b).  
However, the 2.4GHz band is intensively used, with 250 million Wi-Fi 
devices sold in 2006 alone and over 1 billion Bluetooth devices in the 
market. Demand is increasing rapidly, with the 802.11n standard being 
developed using MIMO and beam forming technology to enable yet more 
intensive use of this precious spectrum. Any Wi-Fi user will be able to testify 
to the high number of SSIDs detected in many urban areas. There is very 
little licensed spectrum as intensively used as the 2.4GHz licence-exempt 
band. 
Expansion into 5GHz, the growth route envisaged in Ofcom's Spectrum 
Framework Review (Ofcom, 2005), is suitable for some applications but not 
all. Lower frequencies with better propagation characteristics are better 
suited for creating cost-effective, robust wireless broadband in rural areas, 
and self-forming mesh networks in cities and suburbs capable of routing 
traffic at broadband speeds 4. Mesh technology creates networks that can 
cover substantial areas using multiple short-range links. 
                     
4 This becomes increasingly significant as the concept of universal service obligation 
disappears in a broadband future. 
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Demand for licence-exempt spectrum is often under-estimated simply 
because it has fewer and less vocal advocates than the licensed alternative. 
Some goods and services produce essentially only a consumer surplus, with 
no producer surplus. The absence of direct producer surplus for individual 
companies removes the normal impetus for aggressive advocacy. The 
consumer surplus itself is diffusely allocated since all citizens benefit rather 
than a specific interest group. Thus, those likely to recognise the true 
demand for licence-exempt applications are either citizen activists, public 
interest groups, or a few companies interested in "raising the level of the 
lake for everyone" and building on top of that innovation platform. 
Innovation flourishes in licence-exempt bands 
Experience in the 2.4 GHz ISM band - frequencies once known as the 
"junk bands" - proves the benefits of a licence-exempt allocation. Almost 
every laptop computer on sale today includes Wi-Fi technology that uses this 
band, and most mobile devices include Bluetooth.  
Technology innovation has been dramatic. Maximum network throughput 
speed has increased almost fivefold 5. The 802.11e standard that facilitates 
multimedia applications has contributed to the rapid growth and positive 
outlook for networks that support voice and video streams. The draft 
802.11n standard promises data throughput rates up to 540 Mbit/s, ten times 
faster than today's best devices. 
This has all happened very quickly: the first 802.11 standards underlying 
Wi-Fi were ratified in 1999 and 2000 6. The worldwide market for wireless 
local area networks had grown to $2.5 billion by 2005. By 2009, only a 
decade after its inception, overall Wi-Fi market revenues are forecast to 
reach $4.8 billion 7. 
Licence-exempt allocations encourage entrepreneurs to enter the market, 
leading to innovation and competition. Usage scenarios are decentralised, 
                     
5 From a maximum of 11 Mbps for 802.11b to 54 Mbps for 802.11g and 80.2.11a. 
6 The Economist (2004): The basic 802.11 standard was published in 1997. 802.11b was 
ratified in December 1999, and 802.11a in January 2000. Apple introduced Wi-Fi as an option 
on its new iBook computers in July 1999. 
7 Dell'Oro Group Inc, reported in "Dell'Oro: faster gear to drive Wi-Fi market," Infoworld, 
January 24, 2006. Figures do not include Wi-Fi capabilities embedded in DSL and cable 
modems. 
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leading to rapid industry growth. Start-up companies can develop new 
business models in licence-exempt spectrum where the idea is the primary 
capital required, rather than a spectrum licence. 
Flexible licensing and Licence-exemption compared 
Flexible licensed and licence-exempt allocations have complementary 
strengths and weaknesses: 
Flexible licensing Licence-exemption 
Licensee controls behaviour of all 
transmitters in the band  
Control is decentralised, and users have to 
co-exist with transmitters they do not control  
Statutory protections from interference from 
other users 
Licence-exempt users have to accept 
interference from other users, and (in the 
case of a secondary use) may not interfere 
with primary users 
Spectrum use coordinated by the licensee Spectrum use coordinated through regulation 
on devices, and industry standards  
Relatively high transaction costs for gaining 
‘first party' access to spectrum through 
licensing auction or transfer 
Relatively low transaction costs in obtaining 
‘first party' spectrum access 
High cost of entry for service providers and 
equipment manufacturers 
Low cost of entry for service providers and 
equipment manufacturers 
Market in spectrum licenses and devices Market in devices 
To date, capital expenditure in licensed bands has focused on 
substantial, centralised network infrastructure investments by the licensee.  
Bands which support licence-exempt use have necessarily seen a more 
decentralised investment model where equipment is purchased by end 
users. 
Both regulatory models have transaction and administrative costs 
(BENKLER, 2002; FAULHABER & FABER, 2003): 
 Property-based flexible 
licensed allocation 
Licence-exempt allocation 
Transaction costs Need to negotiate 
permission to transmit in a 
specified band 
Minimal direct cost, but some overhead 
in equipment cost and spectrum usage 
for coordinating communications 
Administrative costs Definition and adjudication 
of property rights 
Definition and enforcement of the 
rights to access spectrum 
Administrative costs in the flexible licensing model are borne by 
government, whether as regulator or through the courts: the costs of defining 
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property rights, running auctions 8, and resolving disputes regarding 
interference. Industry may also bear costs in standard-setting processes. 
The transaction cost of spectrum coordination is borne by licensees and 
sub-licensees.  
The costs for licence-exemption arise both in the administrative process 
of defining and enforcing technical standards to manage congestion and 
harmful interference, and in the "cost" of bandwidth devoted to negotiating 
access among receivers rather than to transferring data.  Some costs are 
embedded in the cost of equipment, and reduced efficiency of 
communications. Administrative costs are borne by government in the 
regulatory process, and by industry in the standard-setting process. There is 
an opportunity cost if the spectrum use entailed by regulation is not the most 
efficient one. If there is little spectrum scarcity, transaction costs decrease; 
administrative costs remain, but may be reduced since standard-setting and 
compliance may be less onerous. 
The two models imply different industry economics. The flexible licensing 
approach favours a network-centric service provider model, while licence-
exemption favours an equipment-centric end-user model. The former implies 
more centralised spectrum management while the latter is more distributed 
and decentralised.  
Current mobile communication and broadcasting services employ a 
service-provider model which facilitates co-ordinated decisions about 
network management. Emerging intelligent radio systems, however, will 
make it increasingly feasible to decouple frequencies and radio networks, 
and to ensure coordination in a decentralised way. With licence-exempt 
spectrum, it is possible to build up a network from end-user equipment that 
can be linked in an ad hoc, wireless mesh. This supports viral, edge-based 
growth and offers an alternative for the future to the service-provider-based 
model.  
The end-user model is unlikely ever to replace completely the service 
provider one, but it is more consistent with the way new technologies are 
developing, and with many market trends in the information society 9. It is 
                     
8 These costs are set off against the (hopefully larger) revenue gained through auctions. 
9 This decentralised model for access can be compared with the innovative network models for 
content distribution and telephony, based on peer-to-peer technology, developed by BitTorrent, 
Skype and others. 
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therefore short-sighted to focus only on flexible licensing in the current 
spectrum reform debate.  
  Two models are better than one 
The choice between flexible licensing and licence-exemption is a choice 
between regulatory models. Any regime choice will bias outcomes. In a 
flexible licensing regime, the pace of innovation and development will be 
controlled by licence holders rather than end-users or equipment suppliers.  
In a licence-exempt regime, on the other hand, end-users and device 
manufacturers drive innovation. Neither model is intrinsically better than the 
other, nor is the choice between them straightforward; diversity in regulatory 
models is therefore the best bet.  
Either licensed or licence-exempt allocations can result in increased 
social welfare, but the combination of the two will result in a greater citizen 
benefit than each individually. For example, a public park enhances the 
value of surrounding owned and leased properties, and the use by residents 
in those properties increases the utility of the park.  
The licence-exempt band at 2.4GHz sits right next to licensed services 
and huge benefits have been created.  In the United States, some wireless 
Internet services have been provided around 2.5GHz using licensed bands, 
and others have successfully used licence-exempt technology around 
2.4GHz. Cellular service providers like T-Mobile USA have created services 
that combine licensed cellular and licence-exempt operation 10, 
demonstrating the value of a blend of licensed and licence-exempt 
allocations.  
The right approach to spectrum management is a judicious mix of 
licensed and licence-exempt uses in all major frequency bands (e.g. below 1 
GHz, between 1 and 3 GHz, 3-10 GHz, 10-60 GHz, above 60 GHz).  
                     
10 The HotSpot @Home service. 
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The limitations of projections of economic value 
The flexible licensing and licence-exemption models are sufficiently 
different that economic analysis is of very limited help in picking between 
them. Licensed spectrum has few operators, and well-defined prices; 
licence-exempt has huge numbers of operators, and no market prices for 
spectrum services.  
Despite the difficulties of long-term prediction, forecasting of economic 
value has been proposed as a key tool for regulators to employ, alongside 
public consultation and analysis of likely congestion, in choosing between 
the flexible licensing and licence-exemption models for new spectrum 
allocations (CAVE & WEBB, 2004). This approach has been used by Ofcom 
(2007a) in its Licence-Exemption Framework Review, and supported by an 
in-depth study to develop methods to estimate the future economic value of 
licence-exempt applications through to 2026 (Indepen et al., 2006). 
The Indepen et al. study models the expected benefits of a few wireless 
communications applications on a socio-economic basis rather than from a 
supply-side, techno-centric view. This is useful since it attempts to capture 
the true consumer benefits of licence-exempt applications. Nevertheless, the 
framework and methodology proposed are likely to under-estimate these: 
the approach is rooted in the current situation and tends to use conservative 
measures of economic benefits. 
Only ten known applications are taken into account and novel 
applications that might well emerge in the future (even the near future) are 
not valued. Also, innovation brings more benefits than originally imagined by 
pioneers: innovation is likely to create positive externalities. However, it is 
impossible to predict when and how these benefits will be realized – 
particularly over a span as long as twenty years. CAVE & WEBB (2004) 
summed it up very well: "It is necessary but impossibly difficult to look 
ahead." 
A further difficulty arises when valuations of putative licensed and 
licence-exempt allocations are compared. The assumptions and methods 
used are likely to be very different for valuing the two allocation types, and 
comparison will be fraught with difficulty. In sum, a test for licence-exemption 
which is based on comparing estimates of the economic value derived from 
licensed and licence-exempt approaches looks rational, but is largely 
arbitrary.  
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Given such uncertainties in calculating the prospective value of 
competing allocation types, setting aside spectrum for licence-exempt 
applications only when the economic value of these applications strictly 
exceeds the value of a licensed allocation (Ofcom, 2005) is not a well-
founded basis for regulatory choice. If regulatory expediency demands such 
comparisons, then licensed and licence-exempt should be considered 
equally viable as long as their putative values are of the same order of 
magnitude.  
Despite these limitations, the Indepen et al. study reaches a positive 
conclusion on the value of licence-exempt applications, noting: 
"Certain LE applications, such as short range radars, RFIDs in retail 
and public access Wi-Fi could generate economic benefits for the UK 
which are substantially greater per MHz of use than the highest value 
licensed applications." 
Still, there is a risk that once numbers are available from an economic 
model such as this, they will be compared superficially with numbers derived 
in a completely different way for licensed applications. Indeed Ofcom 
(2007a) uses figures from the Indepen et al. study to suggest that even Wi-Fi 
at 2.4 GHz may have a lower economic value than a licensed cellular 
alternative. This could be taken to imply that if the 2.4 GHz band had not 
already been made licence-exempt, it would not be made so today. Given 
the phenomenal success and user benefits of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and so on 
(not to mention microwave ovens), this cannot be right.  
Rather than relying on largely meaningless 20-year estimates of 
revenues and benefits, we suggest that regulators compare the nearer-term 
costs of creating and operating under licensed and licence-exempt regimes 
in a particular band. Both BENKLER (2002) and FAULHABER & FABER 
(2003) discussed differences in transaction and administrative costs 
between the two allocation types, though without providing numerical 
examples. 
While also uncertain since they pertain to putative allocations, set-up and 
overhead costs are front-loaded and less likely to be sensitive to the 
imprecision of long-run analysis, and administrative costs are less sensitive 
to the vagaries of innovation. In many cases, licensed allocations of compact 
bands may have lower costs than licence-exemption; conversely, licence-
exemption may have lower costs when spectrum is to be used in an 
opportunistic way with evolving rules in "messy" bands where transferable 
96   No. 67, 3rd Q. 2007 
property rights may be difficult to define up front, expensive to trade, and 
costly to rationalize in negotiation with many other licensed band occupants.  
Difficulties with congestion criteria 
Congestion has been proposed as a criterion for deciding between 
licensed and licence-exempt use (CAVE & WEBB, 2004; Ofcom, 2007a). In 
some cases, such as very high frequencies with very short range 
propagation, this approach yields common sense results: licensing is not 
necessary. While congestion has a relatively well-defined meaning in 
network management, it is difficult to define for spectrum policy purposes, 
particularly in bands where the frequency is neither very high nor very low. 
Congestion is sometimes defined as the situation in which spectrum demand 
exceeds available supply, and  sometimes it is used interchangeably with 
harmful interference.  
Since congestion is typically used in licence-exemption analyses, there is 
an implication that licensed allocations do not suffer from congestion. That 
might be correct as a matter of definition, since a spectrum licensee can 
increase the price of access (or, in the case of cellular networks, drop calls) 
until demand matches supply. Since spectrum access is not priced in 
licence-exempt bands, this mechanism is not available. However, spectrum 
demand is managed in this case by declines in quality of service rather than 
by increases in price. The number of users grows until interference deters 
additional access. Further, congestion, defined as harmful inter-user 
interference, is only a problem if there's an expectation of guaranteed quality 
of service – and there is no such expectation in licence-exempt bands 11.  
The amount of coordination required for many concurrent users of a 
spectrum band is an alternative criterion to congestion tests for allocation 
decisions. If little or no coordination is required, license-exemption is 
indicated. Such an approach would yield the same result as Ofcom's 
congestion analysis for very high frequencies where there is a large amount 
of capacity (Ofcom, 2007a, Section 6), but would also allow regulators to 
consider bands such as UHF where capacity is scarce. It also provides a 
                     
11 Licence-exempt allocations suffer from a Catch-22: if there are so few users that there is no 
mutual interference, then the band is adjudged to be under-used, and a wasteful allocation; on 
the other hand, if there are so many users that there is mutual interference, it's deemed to be 
congested, unusable, and a wasteful allocation. 
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framework for incorporating band rules like power control and politeness that 
improve coordination. 
Criteria for selecting Licence-exempt  vs Licensed 
Choosing between licensed and licence-exempt allocations is difficult. It 
requires a judicious combination of economic, technical, and regulatory 
judgments.  
• Where little or no coordination among independent band users is 
required to prevent harmful interference, licence-exempt (with appropriate 
rules) is an appropriate allocation. 
• Choose between licensed and licence-exempt allocations on the basis 
of estimates of set-up and operating costs rather than forward-looking 
estimates of speculative long-term consumer benefits. 
• Licence-exempt applications result in consumer benefit, rather than 
producer surplus. Measures of consumer benefit should be sophisticated 
enough to recognise the time spent on activities as well as the money spent 
on them 12. Licensed valuations should explicitly separate out the values 
attributed to producer surplus and to consumer surplus, so that consumer-
surplus-only comparisons can also be made. 
• Comparisons with licensed valuations, if used, should carefully 
consider any differing underlying assumptions, since the effects of these can 
easily dwarf differences between the applications themselves. 
• Take into account the value of having a combination of licensed and 
licence-exempt applications in the same "spectrum neighbourhood", and of a 
combination of licence-exempt applications in different bands.  
• Recognize the innovation value and social benefit of licence-exempt 
applications. 
Economic projections can never replace the need for strategic policy 
judgments by the regulator. The benefits of licence-exemption are enjoyed 
today in many cases because of historical decisions made to allow 
experimentation in Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) bands such as 
                     
12 Only about 0.2% of consumer spending in the U.S., for example, went for Internet access in 
2004 yet time use data indicates that people spent around 10% of their entire leisure time going 
online (GOOLSBEE & KLENOW, 2006). This suggests that conventional consumer surplus 
calculations significantly understate the value of internet assets. 
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that at 2.4GHz. However, a real danger with the current focus on flexible 
licensing is that a system is established under which forward-looking 
allocations like this might never be made again. 
  Case Study - The UHF Digital Dividend 
The transition from analogue to digital television which is taking place 
around the world provides an opportunity to re-allocate some of the UHF 
spectrum which is currently employed for broadcasting. Once the analogue 
services are switched off at the end of the transition, the spectrum 
allocations used by the remaining digital broadcasts can if necessary be 
reconfigured so as to clear some spectrum (the "Digital Dividend") for other 
uses. 
This is an area of very active work in the US, with two main threads. First, 
in April 2007, the FCC released a Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking which addresses rules governing wireless licences in 
the 698-806 MHz Band (more commonly referred to as the "700 MHz Band") 
(FCC 2007). This spectrum currently is occupied by television broadcasters 
in TV channels 52-69 and is being made available for wireless services, 
including public safety and commercial services, as a result of the digital 
television ("DTV") transition. The DTV transition is due to end in February 
2009, releasing the clear spectrum for other applications from that date at 
the latest. 
Second, in October 2006 the FCC issued its First Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning Unlicensed Operation in 
the TV Broadcast Bands (FCC, 2006). This is commonly referred to as the 
"white space" issue, and concerns unused localised spectrum within the 
bands still to be employed for broadcasting. This notice indicated the FCC's 
intention to allow licence-exempt operation, and sets out a schedule with 
laboratory and field test results to be published in summer 2007; a second 
Report and Order specifying final requirements for devices operating in the 
TV bands in the autumn of 2007; and equipment to be permitted for retail 
sale from the planned end of the DTV transition in February 2009.  
Broadly speaking, the intention is to use service and technology neutral 
auctions to allocate most of the cleared spectrum in the 700MHz band, with 
some being reserved for public safety, and for licence-exempt operation to 
be allowed in the white space. 
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In the United Kingdom, Ofcom issued its "Digital Dividend Review" 
consultation in December 2006 (Ofcom, 2006). This sets out proposals for 
the equivalent DTV transition in the UK, referred to as the "digital 
switchover", which is due to be completed in 2012. In this case there are 
fifteen 8 MHz channels to be cleared for other uses (channels 31-37, 39-40 
and 63-68), as well as "interleaved channels" usable on a localised basis 
within the spectrum to be retained for broadcasting (equivalent to the white 
space).  
Broadly speaking, Ofcom's proposals are for service and technology 
neutral auctions both for the cleared channels and also for interleaved 
channel capacity. 
In Europe as a whole, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) 
published an opinion on the digital TV transition in February 2007 (RSPG 
2007). It encourages all European administrations to take actions to enable 
the development of "new services fostering growth and innovation" in the 
Digital Dividend, but also sounds a note of caution warning that they must 
not "conflict with national and European content legislation aiming at 
promoting cultural diversity and media pluralism". 
Also a mandate has been given by the EC to the CEPT for technical 
studies to be completed before the end of 2007 in three important areas for 
the Digital Dividend (ERO, 2007): 
- compatibility issues between "cellular / low-power transmitter" 
networks and "larger coverage / high power tower" type of networks; 
- the technical feasibility of harmonising a sub-band of UHF bands IV 
and V for mobile applications (including uplinks); 
- a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of fitting new/future 
applications/services into non-harmonised spectrum of the digital 
dividend (namely to so-called "white spots" between allotments). 
In spite of these technical studies on new possibilities, in most of 
mainland Europe there is currently a greater emphasis on continued 
broadcasting use of the Digital Dividend, rather than on flexible licensing or 
licence-exemption. 
The Digital Dividend is a prime example of a situation where licence-
exemption risks being sidelined, especially in Europe. Doing so would miss a 
once in a lifetime opportunity for reconsideration of an important spectrum 
resource.  
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The potential for licence-exempt operation  
in UHF frequencies below 1 GHz 
Providing licence-exempt devices with access to spectrum below 1 GHz 
will allow the manufacture and sale of devices featuring lower power, lower 
cost, more reliable, and relatively longer-range communication capability. 
These devices would take advantage of the favourable physical propagation 
characteristics of this spectrum by, for example, easily going through walls to 
enable inter-home mesh networking and better in-home coverage in 
municipal wireless networks. 
The potential for a market at least equivalent to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth at 
2.4 GHz would exist for the licence-exempt use of UHF spectrum. Possible 
applications include: 
- self organising, mesh connected community and campus networks, 
- in-home multi-media distribution, 
- local coverage extension for digital broadcast networks – e.g. DTT 
and DAB 13,  
- remote patient monitoring and elderly care, 
- game play, 
- people, animal and asset tracking, 
- industrial automation and control, 
- home automation and control, 
- security covering whole homes, larger properties, communities and 
campuses, 
- public safety. 
Most of these applications would require much less infrastructure when 
compared to the existing shorter range ISM band solutions at 2.4Ghz or 
5GHz, thus creating a significant benefit to the user. 
Mesh networks 
Neighbourhood mesh networks can increase choice and extend internet 
access to lower income groups by enabling shared network access. They 
grow organically; they do not require any infrastructure; they are robust and 
                     
13 The coverage of new digital broadcast networks, such as DAB and DTT is often constrained 
by lack of capital or a need to avoid interference. Enabling the use of low cost, home-area fillers 
on a licence-exempt basis may provide an economically viable means of extending coverage, 
for example, by allowing portables and second sets to be used conveniently. 
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fault tolerant; no centralised management is necessary. Thus they empower 
the individual by facilitating choice and competition at the edge of networks, 
features which are often absent in rural and some suburban areas. However 
there are important challenges in being able to provide the necessary range, 
scale, and capacity using existing 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz licence-exempt 
spectrum, as illustrated in this example 14. 
Figure 1 - 5 GHz: Bandwidth is good but measured range (circle) is poor. Range is not 
sufficient to bootstrap mesh until installed percentage is quite high  
(in this diagram ~50%) 
 
Figure 2 - 700 MHz: Much better range.  
Three 2 MHz channels can bootstrap a neighbourhood with ~3-5 Mbps 
 
                     
14 The diagrams in this section are based on those used by Jawad Khaki, Microsoft, in his 
keynote speech to the IEEE DySPAN conference in Dublin on 19 April 2007. 
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Figure 3 - Dual Frequency Network: As more clients come online, links form  
in high-frequency range and more of the mesh is connected with high-bandwidth 
 
A combination of higher and lower frequency licence-exempt bands 
maximises spectrum utilization, and reduces the need for coordination by 
minimising the number of longer-range 15 links.  
Licence-exempt use of the Digital TV "White Spaces" 
A particular feature of the digital TV transition is that even within the 
spectrum nominally to be retained for broadcasting, there are many vacant 
"white spaces" or "interleaved channels". In most areas, this capacity is in 
fact greater than the amount of spectrum that will be cleared completely. For 
example, in the UK, fifteen 8 MHz channels are to be cleared, and thirty-two 
8 MHz channels are to be retained for broadcasting. At any one transmitter 
site, only six of these channels will be used for broadcasting, leaving up to 
26 potentially vacant. Clearly there are overlap areas where 12 of the 32 
channels will be in use, and there are also professional radio microphone 
and talk-back systems which are currently allowed to use these vacant 
channels on a very localised basis. But the reality is that no matter where the 
reader happens to be, a scan of the UHF TV band with a spectrum analyser 
would reveal many unused channels. 
                     
15 Note that even the longer-range links are still quite short, of the order of 100m. 
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The criteria outlined above for choosing between licensed and licence-
exempt indicates that a license-exempt allocation would be suitable in the 
UHF TV band: 
• Low transmission power limits (for example, 100 mW) would limit 
range and require minimal coordination that can be easily handled by current 
licence-exempt technology. 
• Allocating the interleaved channels to licensed use would entail 
significant costs in setting up auctions with limited proceeds, given that 
available white space varies by geography, and that new licensees would 
have to coexist not only with broadcasters but also licensed radio 
microphone systems. Overhead costs are likely to be lower for a licence-
exempt allocation. 
• There will be licensed allocations in the adjacent cleared broadcast 
channels, which when combined with a licence-exempt allocation will create 
a whole greater than the parts.  
• The mesh example above demonstrated the value of combined 
operation in longer- and shorter-range licence-exempt bands. 
• In the United States, a consortium has submitted proposals 16 to the 
FCC for licence-exempt use of these white spaces using portable devices 
that will detect and avoid broadcasts and radio-microphones, providing the 
consumer benefits and potential applications discussed above. Microsoft 
(NARLANKA, 2007) and Philips (CHALLAPALI, 2007) have both submitted 
to the FCC prototype devices which demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
detect-and-avoid techniques. Similar proposals have also been submitted by 
Microsoft, Philips and Intel to Ofcom in response to its Digital Dividend 
Review 17. Innovation in this band is just beginning. Indeed, as would be 
expected with licence-exempt applications, the best use has probably not 
been invented yet. 
                     
16 Comments in proceeding 04-186 of Dell, Microsoft, Google, HP, Intel and Philips, submitted 
on 31 January 2007, and Reply Comments submitted on 2 March 2007, available online from 
the FCC at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi 
17 Available online via Ofcom's website. 
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  Conclusions 
The flexible licensing and licence-exempt regulatory models complement 
each other, and a combination is more valuable than either individually.  
Licenses are just one kind of spectrum-related market; a licence-exempt 
allocation creates a market in device technologies in which manufacturers 
compete with each other to provide affordable innovation directly to end-
users. 
There are vacant channels between broadcast television stations. This 
spectrum can be used by licence-exempt devices without harming television 
viewing.  
A licence exempt allocation of these bands would be the most productive 
way to use this spectrum because licence-exempt spectrum: 
- it is a proven way to generate technical and commercial innovation; 
- it promotes healthy diversity in markets and regulatory models;  
- it complements the work regulators are already doing to introduce 
market mechanisms through flexible licensing. 
A broad cross-section of society would benefit, including rural and inner-
city residents seeking affordable Internet access, entrepreneurs starting up 
digital communication businesses, cities and companies seeking to foster 
growth and productivity, and citizens who want to create community 
networks. 
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